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I. INTRODUCTION
If you are a diehard fan, as I am, of the famed Indiana Jones movie
franchise,1 you will undoubtedly remember Indiana Jones and the
Last Crusade.2  In this third installment of the Indiana Jones
franchise, Indiana Jones, the renowned adventurer and archaeologist,
receives a diary from his father, Dr. Henry Jones Sr., that holds sev-
eral innocuous clues and a map with no monikers that supposedly
reveals the location of the wondrous Holy Grail.3  By piecing together
seemingly innocuous clues, one after another, clue by clue, using only
the diary and the map as a guide, Indiana Jones is able to determine
the exact location and whereabouts of the Holy Grail, which had been
mysteriously lost for hundreds of years, and, in doing so, he managed
to stop Adolf Hitler and the Nazis from world domination.  Imagine,
taking ostensibly independent, innocuous clues that hold very little
probative value in and of themselves but, when amassed together,
hold the secret to the greatest discovery of mankind: a secret that for
several hundred years the Knights of the First Crusade defended, died
for, and tried to keep hidden from public eye.  Well, while only a fic-
tional movie, this is exactly what Indiana Jones was able to do in 1938
using only a diary and a map with no names.  Imagine the movie to-
day, but only this time, Indiana Jones has a GPS device.4
Essentially, but in less dramatic form, this is the argument raised
by District of Columbia Jones5 in United States v. Maynard.6  Antoine
Jones, who was the owner of a nightclub in the District of Columbia
called “Levels,” was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and posses-
sion with the intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base.7  Jones’s
1. The Indiana Jones movie series was created by George Lucas and directed by
Stephen Spielberg and included four installments:  Raiders of the Lost Ark in
1981, Indiana Jones and the Temple of Doom in 1984, Indiana Jones and the Last
Crusade in 1989, and Indiana Jones and the Kingdom of the Crystal Skull in
2008.
2. Id.  The Indiana Jones and the Last Crusade screenplay was written by Jeffrey
Boam.
3. The Holy Grail is most commonly identified with a cup or chalice used by Jesus
Christ at the Last Supper. See definition of “grail,” MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTION-
ARY (2013).
4. A GPS is a device that receives Global Positioning System (GPS) signals capable
of determining a user’s exact location anywhere in the world. See Renée McDon-
ald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth Amendment,
55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 414–21 (2007) (detailing the science and uses of GPS
technology).
5. “District Columbia Jones” is a metaphoric reference to the defendant, Antoine
Jones, the District of Columbia nightclub owner whose conviction for drug con-
spiracy was overturned in United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir.
2010), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
6. 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct.
945 (2012).
7. Id. at 548–49.
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conviction was based in part on the use of a GPS tracking device at-
tached to a Jeep driven by Jones.  The GPS tracking device was used
by law enforcement to track Jones’s movements twenty-four hours a
day over a twenty-eight day period.8  Jones argued that his conviction
should be overturned because the police violated his Fourth Amend-
ment rights by tracking him without a warrant.9  Specifically, Jones
argued that the use of the GPS tracking device violated his “reasona-
ble expectation of privacy”10 and was therefore a search under the
Fourth Amendment.  The D.C. Circuit Court, in an opinion written by
Judge Douglas Ginsburg and joined by Judges Tatel and Griffith, de-
cided that the government’s warrantless use of a GPS tracking device
to track Jones’s every movement for a four-week period violated his
Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and in-
troduced a new theory of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence—the “mo-
saic theory.”11
The mosaic theory refers to a concept borrowed from a series of
cases involving challenges by the government to requests under the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),12 which was adapted by the May-
nard court for Fourth Amendment use.13  The theory is based on the
concepts that the whole is greater than the sum of its individual parts
and that the aggregation of information takes on greater significance
when combined with other information.14  “Combining the items il-
luminates their interrelationships and breeds analytic synergies, so
that the resulting mosaic of information is worth more than the sum of
its parts.”15  Applying this theory in Maynard, the D.C. Circuit Court
found that isolated and discrete actions of the government that are not
deemed searches individually may become searches when aggregated
together en masse,16 thus violating a person’s reasonable expectation
8. Id. at 555.
9. Id.
10. See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
11. See generally David E. Pozen, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the
Freedom of Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628 (2005) (discussing the evolution of
the mosaic theory in the context of the FOIA and national security).
12. See id.
13. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 560–63.
14. See Pozen, supra note 11, at 630. See also Maynard, 615 F.3d at 561 (discussing
prior courts’ distinctions between the whole and the sum of its parts in regard to
data collection).
15. Pozen, supra note 11, at 630.
16. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558.  In rejecting the government’s contention that no
distinction should be drawn between the information discovered by use of a
beeper in a single discrete journey at issue in Knotts and the more comprehensive
monitoring at issue in Maynard, the Circuit Court applied the mosaic theory,
stating that:
[T]he totality of Jones’s movements over the course of a month—was not
exposed to the public: First, unlike one’s movements during a single
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of privacy.17  Aided by this newly formulated theory, the Maynard
court found that the government’s warrantless use of a GPS tracking
device to track the defendant’s public movements for four weeks vio-
lated the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy and consti-
tuted a search under the Fourth Amendment.18
The Maynard decision marked a dramatic shift in Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence and, at the time of its decision in 2010, was con-
trary to holdings of several other circuit courts.19  When the Supreme
Court reviewed the Maynard decision in 2012 in the retitled action
United States v. Jones,20 even though the Supreme Court did not re-
solve the case using the mosaic theory, Justice Sotomayor’s concurring
opinion and Justice Alito’s concurring opinion, which was signed or
joined by three other justices, endorsed some form of the mosaic
theory.21
journey, the whole of one’s movements over the course of a month is not
actually exposed to the public because the likelihood anyone will observe
all those movements is effectively nil. Second, the whole of one’s move-
ments is not exposed constructively even though each individual move-
ment is exposed, because that whole reveals more—sometimes a great
deal more—than does the sum of its parts.
Id.
17. See id.
18. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563 (“Society recognizes Jones’s expectation of privacy
in his movements over the course of a month as reasonable, and the use of the
GPS device to monitor those movements defeated that reasonable expectation.”).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 610 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding
that despite a lack of standing, defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were not
violated by installation and use of a GPS tracking device on defendant’s vehicle);
United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1215 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding
that the use of GPS tracking device did not violate the Fourth Amendment rights
of defendant because defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy), cert.
granted, 132 S. Ct. 1533 (2012); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997–98
(7th Cir. 2007) (holding that the warrantless use of GPS tracking device on defen-
dant’s vehicle was not a search or seizure).
20. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
21. See Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV.
311, 313 (2012) (“The majority opinion resolved the case without reaching the
mosaic theory, and neither concurring opinion gave the issue extensive analysis.
But Justice Alito’s concurring opinion for four [J]ustices clearly echoed the basic
reasoning of the D.C. Circuit in concluding that long-term GPS monitoring of a
car counts as a search even though short-term monitoring does not.  Justice
Sotomayor’s separate concurrence also voiced support for the mosaic approach.”)
(footnotes omitted). See also Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955–56 (Sotomayor, J., concur-
ring).  Concerned about the degree of intrusiveness capable with GPS technology,
Justice Sotomayor questioned “whether people reasonably expect that their
movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the
[g]overnment to ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious be-
liefs, sexual habits, and so on.” Id. at 956.  Justice Alito also seems to be in ac-
cord with Justice Sotomayor when he states, “for four weeks, law enforcement
agents tracked every movement that respondent made in the vehicle he was driv-
ing.” Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasis added).
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In the aftermath of Maynard, many articles were written on the
mosaic theory and its viability for Fourth Amendment application.22
Some of the articles argued against the wisdom of the mosaic theory
and its use in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence because of its imprac-
ticability.23  According to those commentators, implementing the mo-
saic theory would be difficult if not impossible to administer.24
Without a doubt, the mosaic theory raises several challenging issues
for the future of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  Notwithstanding,
however, and despite the wide-ranging criticism, the application of the
mosaic theory may help establish and restore a balance between our
public and private lives.
Prior to the dawn of modern technology, “the greatest protections
of privacy were neither constitutional nor statutory, but practical.”25
In the pre-computer age, we could go about our daily public lives with-
out the fear or even conscious thought that our day-to-day movements
and our comings and goings were monitored or even taken note of,
precisely because the effort and cost required to undertake such a task
was impractical.26  Today, amid new technologies capable of constant
twenty-hour, seven-day-a-week monitoring, the boundary between our
public and private life is no longer defined by practical considerations
and, as a result, our privacy (and our reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy) is being eroded with each new technological advance.  With to-
22. See, e.g., Kerr supra note 21; Courtney E. Walsh, Surveillance Technology and the
Loss of Something a Lot Like Privacy: An Examination of the “Mosaic Theory” and
the Limits of the Fourth Amendment, 24 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 169 (2012); Made-
laine Virginia Ford, Comment, Mosaic Theory and the Fourth Amendment: How
Jones Can Save Privacy in the Face of Evolving Technology, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER
SOC. POL’Y & L. 1351 (2011); Benjamin M. Ostrander, Note, The “Mosaic Theory”
and Fourth Amendment Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1733 (2011); Bethany L.
Dickman, Note, Untying Knotts: The Application of Mosaic Theory to GPS Sur-
veillance in United States v. Maynard, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 731 (2011); Erin Smith
Dennis, Note, A Mosaic Shield: Maynard, The Fourth Amendment, and Privacy
Rights in the Digital Age, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 737, 739 (2011).
23. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 21, at 346 (“The first difficulty with the mosaic theory
is the most obvious: its implementation raises so many difficult questions that it
will prove exceedingly hard to administer effectively.”); Ostrander, supra note 22,
at 1748 (“The application of the ‘mosaic theory’ to the Fourth Amendment would
not only be wrong in principle, it would be impractical in application.”). But see
Ford, supra note 22, at 1365 (“The mosaic theory is a novel theory in the Fourth
Amendment context and it could dramatically change privacy jurisprudence.”);
Dennis, supra note 22, at 739 (“The mosaic theory of privacy proffered in May-
nard has the potential to impact not only GPS surveillance, but the wider realm
of Internet and digital surveillance . . . .”); Dickman, supra note 22, at 737–38
(“The mosaic theory is a novel and much-needed addition to the traditional Katz
framework.”).
24. See Kerr, supra note 21, at 346.
25. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).
26. See id. at 963 (Justice Alito noted, “Traditional surveillance for any extended pe-
riod of time was difficult and costly and therefore rarely undertaken.”).
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day’s technology, the government is no longer constrained by
investigatory methods that require massive amounts of time, man-
power, or resources.27  New technology has enabled law enforcement
officials to become more cost-effective and efficient, without concern
with the practical considerations that existed prior to wiretaps,28 pen
registries,29 thermal scanners,30 beepers,31 and GPS technology.32
Notwithstanding the many issues raised with respect to the use of
the mosaic theory as a new Fourth Amendment theory for protection
of privacy rights,33 the application of the mosaic theory in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence may help resolve issues that neither Katz
nor Jones resolve34 and may help strike a balance between the govern-
ment’s interest in investigating crime and society’s interest in main-
taining privacy in and out of the public eye.  In short, the mosaic
theory will ensure the degree of public privacy, particularly with re-
spect to our public movements, that society has come to expect, de-
spite the erosion of practical considerations that once limited the
extent to which law enforcement could invade individual privacy
rights without violating the Fourth Amendment.35
In this regard, this Article will discuss the mosaic theory and the
issues raised regarding its viability in resolving Fourth Amendment
privacy concerns, particularly concerns raised over one’s public move-
ments from place to place in the wake of advanced surveillance and
monitoring technology.  Additionally, this Article will discuss how ap-
plication of the mosaic theory, despite its flaws, may provide a balanc-
27. See id. at 963–64.  Referring to the GPS surveillance at issue in Jones, Justice
Alito noted that if traditional methods of surveillance were employed to monitor
the defendant for four weeks “a large team of agents, multiple vehicles, and per-
haps aerial assistance” would have been required. Id. at 963.  Justice Alito also
noted that devices like the one at issue in Jones, “make long-term monitoring
relatively easy and cheap.” Id. at 964.
28. See generally Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); Goldman v. United
States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
29. See generally Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
30. See generally Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
31. See generally United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983); United States v. Karo,
468 U.S. 705 (1984).
32. See generally Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
33. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. See also infra section III.C (addressing
concerns regarding the implementation of mosaic theory).
34. See Jace C. Gatewood, It’s Raining Katz and Jones: The Implications of United
States v. Jones—A Case of Sound and Fury, 33 PACE L. REV. 683 (2013) (making
the argument that neither Katz nor Jones provides adequate protection against
warrantless surveillance either because, given today’s technology, there is no
physical trespass involved, because of the nature of the intrusion involved, or
because of the pervasiveness of the technology involved).
35. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment) (“[S]ociety’s expec-
tation has been that law enforcement agents and others would not—and indeed,
in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor and catalogue every single move-
ment of an individual’s car for a very long period.”).
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ing effect between the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment
and technological advances that continually blur the line between
what is private and what is public, skewing the scope and meaning of
the Fourth Amendment.
To address these issues, this Article is divided into three parts.
Part II of this Article focuses on how advances in technology have re-
currently exerted pressure on the Fourth Amendment, eroding practi-
cal limitations and creating a ridged line between that which is
private and that which is public.  Part III discusses the mosaic theory,
its application in Maynard and Jones, and the issues raised with re-
spect to its possible future application in Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence.  Finally, Part IV argues that despite all of the concerns and
issues raised with respect to the future application of the mosaic the-
ory, the mosaic theory offers a unique opportunity for the Court to
reestablish equilibrium among the competing values of privacy and
surveillance, fashioning what might be called a public right of privacy.
II. TECHNOLOGY AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. Original Intent of the Fourth Amendment and Its
Practical Limitations
The Fourth Amendment states that “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”36  This proscription
has broadly been interpreted to include a right of privacy37—the right
to be free from unreasonable governmental interference.  Unfortu-
nately, the privacy protection thought to be guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment has never been well-defined.38  As a consequence, the
fundamental protections offered by the Fourth Amendment have be-
come increasingly blurred by the high-tech advances of the past
century.39
When the Framers adopted the Fourth Amendment in 1791, the
search and seizure issues confronted by today’s Supreme Court could
have never been imagined given the technological realities of the
36. U.S. CONST. amend IV.
37. See Jace C. Gatewood, Warrantless GPS Surveillance: Search and Seizure—Us-
ing the Right to Exclude to Address the Constitutionality of GPS Tracking Sys-
tems Under the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 303, 363–65 (2011)
(discussing the shift from a property-based paradigm to a privacy-based para-
digm under the Fourth Amendment).
38. See Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth Amendment Searches, 2012 SUP.
CT. REV. 67 (discussing the history of Fourth Amendment search doctrine from
its original understanding, to its understanding before Olmstead in 1928, to its
understanding from Olmstead to Katz and concluding that the commonly ac-
cepted definition of the term “search” has been misunderstood).
39. See Tracey Maclin, Katz, Kyllo, and Technology: Virtual Fourth Amendment Pro-
tection in the Twenty-First Century, 72 MISS. L.J. 51, 51–58 (2002).
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eighteenth century.40  During the Framers’ era, the focal point of pri-
vacy was the home.41  Evidence suggests that “[s]earches [under the
Fourth Amendment] referred to the forcing open of persons’ houses
and the breaking open of their desks and cabinets in an effort to find
the evidence inside.”42  Thus, as a practical matter, in order to violate
the proscriptions of the Fourth Amendment during the Framers’ era,
and much of the time leading up to the Supreme Court’s most recent
decision in United States v. Jones,43 there needed to be some sort of
physical entry or trespass by the government.44  The use of trespass
as the predominate theory to determine Fourth Amendment violations
is evident throughout the Fourth Amendment’s doctrinal history.45
The Supreme Court’s decision in Jones strongly supports this view.46
Thus, it’s clear that throughout our history, the law of trespass im-
posed a practical limitation on the government’s right to intrude into
our private lives.47  Not only did the law of trespass impose a practical
40. Id. at 52. See also Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 958 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in judg-
ment) (referring to the use of GPS technology and the application of eighteenth
century tort law to GPS use, Justice Alito comments that “it is almost impossible
to think of late-18th-century situations that are analogous to what took place in
this case”).
41. See Kerr, supra note 38, at 72 (“Famous search and seizure cases leading up to
the Fourth Amendment involved physical entries into homes, violent rummaging
for incriminating items once inside, and then arrests and the taking away of evi-
dence found.  These examples, and some contemporaneous statements during the
ratification debates, suggest that home entries and rummaging around inside
were understood as the paradigmatic examples of ‘searches.’”).
42. Id. at 7.
43. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
44. See Kerr, supra note 38, at 73–74. See also Gatewood, supra note 37, at 333
(“[T]he Supreme Court recognized trespass as the driving force for Fourth
Amendment protection.”).
45. See Gatewood, supra note 37, at 333–42 (discussing the Supreme Court’s use of
the “trespass doctrine” from Olmstead to Katz and how, even after Katz, physical
intrusion into a constitutionally protected area was still the barometer in deter-
mining Fourth Amendment violations).
46. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.  Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, stated:
It is important to be clear about what occurred in this case: The Govern-
ment physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining
information.  We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would
have been considered a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment when it was adopted.
Id. (citing Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)).
Justice Scalia quotes the following passage in support of his view:
[O]ur law holds the property of every man so sacred, that no man can set
his foot upon his neighbour’s close without his leave; if he does his is a
trespasser, though he does no damage at all; if he will tread upon his
neighbour’s ground, he must justify it by law. Entick, 95 Eng. Rep at
817.
47. See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949. See also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 466 (1928) (holding  that there  was  no  violation  of  the  defendant’s
Fourth Amendment rights because there was no trespassing into the home or
512 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:504
limitation on the government, but it also imposed a physical
limitation.48
Even as trespass was (and is)49 the ultimate barrier to intrusions
into one’s private life, other practical limitations, such as manpower,
time, and other resources, played a significant role in preventing the
government from delving too deeply into an individual’s personal life
prior to the technological advances of the twentieth century.50  Prior
to the advent of sophisticated surveillance tools, in order to amass the
amount and detail of information that today’s technology can do with
relative ease, law enforcement would have been required to spend
countless hours of manpower and financial resources to garner merely
a fraction of the information.51  Take for instance a hypothetical
presented by former Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist in an article
in 1974, just after he was appointed as Associate Justice to the Su-
preme Court.52  In his hypothetical, Chief Justice Rehnquist asks
whether the government should keep a “dossier of information per-
taining to every citizen”53 and offers the following hypothetical:
Suppose that the local police in a particular jurisdiction were to decide to sta-
tion a police car at the entrance to the parking lot of a well-patronized bar
from 5:30 p.m. to 7:30 p.m. every business day for the purpose of making a list
of the license plates of cars that were driven in and parked in the lot during
that time.  Presumably by appropriate checking with the motor vehicle divi-
sion, the names of the registered owners of the cars could be obtained, and if
there be at least a rebuttable likelihood that a car is generally driven by its
registered owner, a reasonably accurate list of people who patronize the bar
during these hours could be compiled.54
In posing this hypothetical, Chief Justice Rehnquist suggests that
not only would a great majority of people find this kind of police activ-
ity an improper police function in terms of expenditure of taxpayer
dollars55 (and perhaps manpower),56 but that, even if there was suffi-
curtilage  of  the  defendant); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135–36
(1942) (holding that the use of a electronic recording device did not violate the
defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights because there was no physical trespass
into the home or curtilage of the defendant).
48. See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text.
49. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.  In relying on the trespass doctrine, the majority
reasoned that applying common-law trespass principles best preserved the de-
gree of privacy against government intrusion that existed at the  time of the
Fourth Amendment’s adoption, stating that “[w]e have no doubt that such a phys-
ical intrusion would  have been considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.” Id.
50. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
51. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
52. See William H. Rehnquist, Is an Expanded Right of Privacy Consistent with Fair
and Effective Law Enforcement? Or: Privacy, You’ve Come a Long Way Baby, 23
U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (1974).
53. Id. at 9.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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cient manpower available to do it (which, in the context of a criminal
investigation, he recognized to be a physically challenging task, par-
ticularly when more than one individual was implicated),57 most peo-
ple would disprove of such unwarranted surveillance.58  While Chief
Justice Rehnquist found his hypothetical facts too “extreme”59 in
1974, they are not so “extreme” in the twenty-first century.  Looking
at today’s license-plate scanners,60 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s then-hy-
pothetical, is not so hypothetical anymore.61  License-plate scanners
can accomplish exactly what Chief Justice Rehnquist hypothesized in
1974 in a much more efficient manner today.62  It has been estimated
that automatic license-plate scanners are capable of scanning more
than 1500 license plates per minute.63  With this kind of efficiency,
and undoubtedly cost-effectiveness, it is clear to see why law enforce-
ment is steadfastly moving toward the use of such technology.64
License-plate scanners are just one example of how the use of tech-
nology has eroded many practical limitations, including those inferred
by Justice Rehnquist’s hypothetical.  As new technologies in policing
continue to emerge to address an ever-advancing society, any tradi-
tional practical limitation on Fourth Amendment invasions of privacy
that once existed will continue to evaporate, putting pressure on
Fourth Amendment freedoms.65
56. Id. (suggesting that some people may remark in response to his hypothetical that
“if these police officers have nothing better to do, there ought to be a reduction in
the staffing of the police department”).
57. Id. at 10.
58. Id.
59. Id.  Finding no privacy issue with his hypothetical, Justice Rehnquist nonethe-
less feels that “this ought not to be a governmental function when facts are as
extreme as I put them.” Id. (emphasis added).
60. According to some estimates, automatic license-plate recognition systems are ca-
pable of scanning more than 1500 license plates per minute. See Hilary Hylton,
License-Plate Scanners: Fighting Crime or Invading Privacy?, TIME (July 30,
2009), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1913258,00.html.
61. According to a recent survey conducted by the Police Executive Research Forum,
71% of responding agencies indicated they were using license-plate scanners.
The survey also found that almost every police agency expects to acquire or in-
crease their use of license-plate scanners and that within five years they expect
that 25% of their vehicles will be equipped with license-plate scanners. See Criti-
cal Issues in Policing Series, “How Are Innovations in Technology Transforming
Policing?”, POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM, at iii (Jan. 2012) [hereinafter
Issues], available at http://www.policeforum.org/critical-issues-series/ (follow
“How Are Innovations in Technology Transforming Policing? (January 2012)”
hyperlink).
62. See Hylton, supra note 60 and accompany text.
63. Id.
64. See supra note 61, at 1–4.
65. See Maclin, supra note 39, at 52 (“During the first-half of the twentieth century,
Fourth Amendment liberties typically fared poorly under the pressure of a tech-
nologically advancing society.”).
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In addition to the erosion of practical considerations, the use of ad-
vance technology has necessitated a rigid interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment—what a person knowingly exposes to the public, such as
one’s day-to-day movements along public streets, is not protected by
the Fourth Amendment,66 but once the government invades a consti-
tutionally protected area (“persons, houses, papers, and effects”)67
without a warrant, the Fourth Amendment will be violated.68  A brief
look at the “search and seizure” issues confronted by the Supreme
Court beginning in the twentieth century in response to new technol-
ogy provides additional illustration of how the Supreme Court
adapted the Fourth Amendment to address privacy concerns in the
wake of ever-eroding practical limitations and fashioned a somewhat
narrow and inflexible view of privacy in light of public and private
expectations.
B. The Fourth Amendment and the Pressures Exerted by
Advanced Technology
The technological advances in the last century or more have made
it possible for law enforcement to achieve greater efficiency and be-
come more effective at preventing and solving crime.69  The effect of
new technology has not only helped officers become more effective and
efficient, but has made it possible to achieve this efficacy without in-
vading, physically or in any other “private” sense recognized by the
Supreme Court, the right of citizens “to be let alone.”70  This increased
law enforcement efficacy has created pressure on Fourth Amendment
privacy rights and polluted the scope of public and private expecta-
tions.  A few examples of emerging technology used by law enforce-
ment in the last century or more illustrate this point.
1. Wiretapping
One of the earliest uses of new technology by law enforcement was
law enforcement’s use of wiretapping.71  Wiretapping began as soon as
66. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
67. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
68. See U.S. v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984); see also Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27
(2001) (finding that if the “Government uses a device that is not in general public
use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable
without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively un-
reasonable without a warrant”).
69. See Issues, supra note 61, at iii.
70. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(“The makers of our Constitution . . . conferred, as against the government, the
right to be let alone––the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued
by civilized men.”).
71. See Howard, J. Kaplan et al, “The History and Law of Wiretapping,” presented at
ABA Section of Litigation 2012 Section Annual Conference April 18–20, 2012:
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telephones were introduced in the 1870s.72  While some states enacted
piecemeal legislation to prohibit the use of wiretaps,73 the use of wire-
taps by law enforcement went relatively unchallenged until the 1920s
when defendant Roy Olmstead challenged the use of wiretaps by fed-
eral law enforcement officers that resulted in his arrest and convic-
tion.74  In Olmstead v. United States,75 federal agents installed
wiretaps in the street near Olmstead’s house and recorded conversa-
tions that were later used as evidence to convict Olmstead of conspir-
acy to violate the National Prohibition Act.76  The Supreme Court held
that wiretapping involves neither a search nor seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.77  The Court reasoned that be-
cause there was no trespassing into Olmstead’s home or the curtilage
of his home, there was no “search” within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.78  Thus, the “trespass doctrine”79 was born. Olmstead
represents a sharp demarcation by the Supreme Court between that
which is public (streets outside the home)80 and that which is private
The Lessons of the Raj Rajaratnam Trial: Be Careful Who’s Listening, at 2 (“Wire-
tapping has existed for as long as oral communications have been transmitted
over wires.  After the invention of the telegraph in 1837 and the telephone in
1876, private detectives tapped wires for their clients, and businesses tapped
each other’s wires in a nineteenth-century version of corporate espionage.”),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litiga
tion/materials/sac_2012/29-1_history_and_law_of_wiretapping.authcheckdam
.pdf.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See generally United States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 464 (holding that the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit wiretapping in
that “[t]here was no searching.  There was no seizure.  The evidence was secured
by use of the sense of hearing and that only.  There was no entry of the houses or
offices of the defendants.”).
78. Id. at 466.  The Court explained that “one who installs in his house a telephone
instrument with connecting wires intends to project his voice to those quite
outside, and that the wires beyond his house and messages while passing over
them, are not within the protection of the [Fourth] Amendment.” Id.
79. The “trespass doctrine” in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is based on the con-
cept that “the [F]ourth [A]mendment protected ‘persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects’ when these entities were located within a ‘constitutionally protected area.’”
David P. Miraldi, Comment, The Relationship Between Trespass and Fourth
Amendment Protection After Katz v. United States, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 709, 710
(1977); see also Goldman, 316 U.S. 129, 134–35 (relying on the opinion in Olm-
stead, the Supreme Court held that the use of an electronic recording device did
not violate the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights because there was no phys-
ical trespass into the defendant’s home or curtilage).
80. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465 (“The language of the [Fourth Amendment] cannot
be extended and expanded to include telephone wires, reaching to the whole
world from the defendant’s house or office.”).
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(inside the home).81  Thus, property lines marked the degree of pri-
vacy one was afforded.
Even with this strong demarcation, tension was evident in Olm-
stead that there was a need for the Fourth Amendment to adapt to
technological advances.  Justice Brandeis’s dissenting opinion in Olm-
stead illustrates the tension between the traditional guarantees of the
Fourth Amendment against specific governmental abuses of power
and the need to adapt for an ever-changing world.  Justice Brandeis
writes:
When the Fourth and Fifth Amendments were adopted, “the form that evil
had heretofore taken” had been necessarily simple.  Force and violence were
then the only means known to man by which a government could directly ef-
fect self-incrimination.  It could compel the individual to testify—a compul-
sion effected, if need be, by torture.  It could secure possession of his papers
and other articles incident to his private life—a seizure effected, if need be, by
breaking and entry. Protection against such invasion of “the sanctities of a
man’s home and the privacies of life” was provided in the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments by specific language.  But “time works changes, brings into exis-
tence new conditions and purposes.”  Subtler and more far-reaching means of
invading privacy have become available to the government.  Discovery and
invention have made it possible for the government, by means far more effec-
tive than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is
whispered in the closet.82
Justice Brandeis was addressing not only the right of individuals,
but also of criminals, to be free from having conversations intended to
be private intercepted by the government, notwithstanding the lack of
a physical trespass or other intrusion onto the person or property.83
In the area of wiretapping, this tension persisted for many years.
Although Congress outlawed wiretapping in 1934 when it passed the
Communications Act of 1934,84 which became applicable to private
citizens in 1937,85 it was not until 1967 that the Supreme Court in
Katz v. United States86 ruled that wiretapping was a “search” within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.87  In Katz, FBI agents re-
corded the defendant’s conversations using an electronic listening and
recording device attached to the exterior of a telephone booth.88  The
Court concluded that the government’s “activities in electronically lis-
81. Id. at 466 (finding that a person’s Fourth Amendment rights have not been vio-
lated “unless there has been an official search and seizure of his person or such a
seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects or an actual physical inva-
sion of his house ‘or curtilage . . . .’ ”).
82. Id. at 473 (citations omitted).
83. See id. at 457.
84. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (current version at 47
U.S.C. §§ 151–620 (2012)).
85. See Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
86. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 348.
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tening to and recording the [defendant’s] words violated the privacy
upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and
thus constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.”89  In addressing this issue, the tension between
the rigidity of the Fourth Amendment (i.e., “Whether physical pene-
tration of a constitutionally protected area is necessary before a
search and seizure can be said to be violative of the Fourth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution”)90 and need to adapt the
Fourth Amendment to address emerging technology is clearly evident
in the Court’s holding in the following excerpt:
We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been so
eroded by our subsequent decisions that the ‘trespass’ doctrine there enunci-
ated can no longer be regarded as controlling.  The Government’s activities in
electronically listening to and recording the petitioner’s words violated the
privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and
thus constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.  The fact that the electronic device employed to achieve that end
did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can have no constitutional
significance.91
Katz marked a new direction in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
with regard to electronic surveillance while adopting a newly formu-
lated test for determining when a “search” had occurred,92 which be-
came known as the reasonable expectation of privacy test.93  The Katz
reasonable expectation of privacy test informed the Supreme Court’s
decision in many later uses of new technologies.  This newly for-
mulated test, however, seemed to create a new rigid approach to
Fourth Amendment violations—that between public and private
expectations.
2. Pen Registers
Pen registers allow law enforcement officials to record the phone
numbers of all outgoing calls from a particular phone.  This technology
was used by law enforcement officials in Smith v. Maryland.94  In
Smith, at the request of law enforcement, the telephone company in-
stalled a pen register at its offices to record the numbers dialed from
89. Id. at 353.
90. Id. at 350.
91. Id. at 353.
92. Under Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion, the Court adopted a two-pronged test
for determining when a “search” had occurred.  The first prong considers whether
the defendant had an actual or subjective expectation of privacy that was vio-
lated, and the second prong considers whether that “expectation [is] one that soci-
ety is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)
(citations omitted).
93. Id.
94. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
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the petitioner’s telephone.95  In the majority’s opinion, Justice Black-
mun rejected the notion that the installation and use of a pen registry
violated a “legitimate expectation of privacy”96 of the defendant since
the pen register was installed on telephone company property at the
telephone company’s central offices.97  The Court explained that the
defendant had no actual expectation of privacy because “[a]ll tele-
phone users realize that they must ‘convey’ phone numbers to the tele-
phone company, since it is through telephone company switching
equipment that their calls are completed [and that] [a]ll subscribers
realize, moreover, that the phone company has facilities for making
permanent records of the numbers they dial, for they see a list of their
long-distance (toll) calls on their monthly bills.”98  The Court further
explained that even if the defendant had a subjective expectation of
privacy, this expectation is not “one that society is prepared to recog-
nize as ‘reasonable’”99 because the numbers dialed were made public
to the phone company.100
Compelling the Court’s reasoning, which the Court expressly clari-
fied,101 was the fact that “the pen register was installed on telephone
company property at the telephone company’s central offices,”102 and,
therefore, the defendant clearly could not claim that his property was
invaded or that a “constitutionally protected area” was invaded by the
police.  The Court’s need to clarify the exact nature of the conduct
challenged by the defendant was dispositive of the Court’s awareness
of the tension between private and public expectations and further il-
lustrates the Court’s rigid Fourth Amendment formulation regarding
public and private expectations—what is publically disseminated
loses its Fourth Amendment protection.103
95. Id. at 737.
96. Id. at 742.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 743 (citations omitted).
100. Id. at 743–44.
101. Id. at 741 (“In applying the Katz analysis to this case, it is important to begin by
specifying precisely the nature of the state activity that is challenged.  The activ-
ity here took the form of installing and using a pen register.  Since the pen regis-
ter was installed on telephone company property at the telephone company’s
central offices, petitioner obviously cannot claim that his ‘property’ was invaded
or that police intruded into a ‘constitutionally protected area.’  Petitioner’s claim,
rather, is that, notwithstanding the absence of a trespass, the State, as did the
Government in Katz, infringed a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ that peti-
tioner held.”).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 743–44.
2014] THE MOSAIC THEORY 519
3. Beepers
The Supreme Court first considered the use of beeper technology in
United States v. Knotts.104  While the Court ultimately found that the
warrantless use of a beeper tracking device to track a suspect’s move-
ments along public streets did not violate the Fourth Amendment,105
the Court left open the possibility that the use of enhanced surveil-
lance technology, even if done in public, may not always pass constitu-
tional scrutiny.106  This question left open by the Court highlights the
Court’s unwillingness, despite technological advances, to deviate from
its rigid interpretation of the Fourth Amendment that one has no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy while in public.107
In Knotts, Minnesota law enforcement arranged to have a beeper
placed inside a container of chloroform purchased by the defendant
and used the beeper’s signal to track the suspect back to his cabin,
where they found an illegal drug operation.108  The Court concluded
that although the defendant may have had a subjective expectation of
privacy in his movements, “[a] person traveling in an automobile on
public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
movements from one place to another.”109  The Court found no rela-
tive difference between the surveillance technology used and the sur-
veillance itself because following the beeper’s signal was analogous to
visually following the vehicle on the public streets and highways110
and because there was no indication that the beeper was used to re-
104. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
105. Id. at 285 (employing the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test, the Court
held  that  monitoring  beeper signals was “neither a ‘search’ nor a ‘seizure’
within the contemplation of the Fourth Amendment” because monitoring beeper
signals did not invade any reasonable expectation of privacy of the suspect).
106. In response to the Government’s contention that the Court’s ruling may lead to
“twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen,” the Court stated, “if such dragnet-
type law enforcement practices as respondent envisions should eventually occur,
there will be time enough then to determine whether different constitutional
principles may be applicable.” Id. at 283–84 (citation omitted).
107. See id. at 281; see also Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450–51 (1989) (holding
aerial observation of the defendant’s home during helicopter flyover was not a
search under Fourth Amendment); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41–42
(1988) (holding no reasonable expectation of privacy in trash left at curbside
outside defendant’s home); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237–39
(1986) (holding aerial observation of an industrial plant was not a search under
Fourth Amendment); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (holding ae-
rial observation of curtilage of defendant’s home was not a search).
108. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277–79.
109. Id. at 281.
110. See id. at 285.  Furthermore, the Court noted “[t]he fact that the officers in this
case relied not only on visual surveillance, but also on the use of the beeper to
signal . . . does not alter the situation.  Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohib-
ited the police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at
birth with such enhancement as science and technology afforded them in this
case.” Id. at 281.
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veal any information inside the defendant’s home.111  Therefore, be-
cause all of the defendant’s movements could be observed publicly
there was no constitutional objection.  However, when the same issue
came before the Supreme Court in United States v. Karo,112 just over
a year later, the Court held that monitoring of a beeper signal while
located in a private residence closed to visual surveillance was a viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment and the rights of “those who ha[d] a
justifiable interest in the privacy of the residence.”113
Knotts and Karo strongly reflect the dichotomy in the Supreme
Court’s approach to new technology and the Fourth Amendment,
which ultimately preserves the division between the public and pri-
vate realms.
4. Thermal Imaging
Thermal imaging illustrates a more novel example of how the Su-
preme Court has preserved the dichotomy between public and private
expectations in the wake of new technology.  The Supreme Court con-
sidered thermal imaging in Kyllo v. United States.114
In Kyllo, police directed a thermal imaging device at the home of
the defendant, who was suspected of growing marijuana, to determine
if the amount of heat coming from his home was consistent with the
heat that emanates from high-intensity lamps typically used to grow
marijuana.115  The Court held that use of thermal imaging technology
constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment because the use of
the technology allowed the government to obtain information about
the inside of the home that was not otherwise accessible without a
physical intrusion.116  In essence, the Court’s ruling limited Fourth
Amendment invasions of privacy to those originally thought to be pro-
tected when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.117  However, even
though the Court seemed concerned that the use of police technology
may erode such Fourth Amendment guarantees,118 the Court may
111. Id. at 285.
112. 468 U.S. 705, 708–10.  In Karo, DEA agents used a beeper contained in a can of
ether purchased by the defendant to track his movements, which eventually led
the agents to a residence rented by the defendant, where they found illegal drug
manufacturing equipment.
113. Id. at 714.
114. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
115. Id. at 30.
116. Id. at 40.
117. Id. at 34 (explaining that its holding “assures preservation of that degree of pri-
vacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was
adopted”).
118. Id. at 34 (acknowledging that the home was the prototypical area of protected
privacy, the Court stated, “[t]o withdraw protection of [privacy of the home]
would be to permit police technology to erode the privacy guaranteed by the
Fourth Amendment”).
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have essentially unwittingly gutted those Fourth Amendment protec-
tions by intimating that if the technology used was in general public
use, even the home may not be protected against technological
innovations.119
Nevertheless, it was apparent from the Court’s holding that tech-
nology can push the Fourth Amendment boundary between that
which is public and that which is private to its furthest limits120 and
blur the scope of Fourth Amendment protections.121
Kyllo’s return to historical Fourth Amendment guarantees was
echoed in the recent Supreme Court decision regarding GPS
technology.
5. GPS Devices
The Supreme Court again returned to the traditional notions of
Fourth Amendment guarantees in United States v. Jones.122  The
Court, ignoring all recent precedent, held that the warrantless instal-
lation and subsequent use of a GPS tracking device to track the move-
ment of a suspect’s vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment.123
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, focused exclusively on com-
mon law trespass to resolve the issue.124  While the Jones opinion was
unanimous, the Justices were split five to four on which constitutional
precedent to use to resolve the issue—the Katz reasonable expectation
of privacy test or the trespass doctrine.
In relying on the trespass doctrine, the majority rationalized that
applying common law trespass principles best preserves the degree of
privacy afforded by the Fourth Amendment at the time of its adop-
tion.125  The concurring opinions of Justices Sotomayor and Alito criti-
119. Id. at 34 (“We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any informa-
tion regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been ob-
tained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,’
constitutes a search—at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in
general public use.”) (citations omitted).
120. Id. at 33–34 (“It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to
citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of
technology.”).
121. Id. at 31 (“The permissibility of ordinary visual surveillance of a home used to be
clear because, well into the 20th century, our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
was tied to common-law trespass.”).
122. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
123. Id. at 948–54.
124. Id. at 949–50.
125. Id. at 949 (“We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been
considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was
adopted.”).
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cized the majority use of the trespass doctrine and raised several
questions left unanswered by Justice Scalia’s approach.126
Justice Sotomayor thought that the issue should have been re-
solved by focusing on social norms and societal expectations.127  She
wrote, “I would take [the] attributes of GPS monitoring into account
when considering the existence of a reasonable societal expectation of
privacy in the sum of one’s public movements.”128  She stated more
specifically that “I would ask whether people reasonably expect that
their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that
enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their politi-
cal and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”129  Justice Alito
would have focused on the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test
to resolve the issue, although he noted that the Katz test was not with-
out its own problems.130
The varying opinions of the Justices in Jones make it patently
clear that new technology poses a risk to Fourth Amendment privacy
rights that are so complex and varying that the Justices have chosen
to punt on most of the critical issues, leaving them to be addressed,
perhaps, another day.131  Not only have the Justices decided to re-
serve critical issues for later discussion or legislative enactment,132
but they have continued down a path that almost ensures that use of
new technology, particularly surveillance and tracking technology,
continues to erode away at traditional practical limitations that once
defined Fourth Amendment protections, while redefining the scope of
privacy in a way that ensures all our public movements are suscepti-
ble to scrutiny by law enforcement at anytime and anywhere.
So, what is the correct resolution?  One might find the answer in a
theory originating from a series of cases involving challenges by the
government to requests under the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA)—the mosaic theory,133 which was adapted for Fourth Amend-
ment use in Maynard.134  Curiously enough, a majority of the Su-
126. See id. at 954–57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring), 957–64 (Alito, J., concurring in
judgment).
127. See id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See id. at 958, 962 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment) (finding the Katz test pref-
erable but noting difficulties inherent in the test).
131. Id. at 954 (majority opinion) (“We may have to grapple with these ‘vexing
problems’ in some future case . . . .”).
132. Id. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment) (“[C]oncern about new intrusions on
privacy may spur the enactment of legislation to protect against these
intrusions.”).
133. See generally Pozen, supra note 11.
134. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 560–63 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d sub
nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
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preme Court appears willing to accept this new theory of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.135
III. THE MOSAIC THEORY AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. The Origins of the Mosaic Theory
The mosaic theory finds its genesis in cases involving national se-
curity where the government sought to block information requests
under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).136  The mosaic theory
describes how “apparently harmless pieces of information when as-
sembled together could reveal a damaging picture.”137  The govern-
ment has successfully invoked the mosaic theory on numerous
occasions to justify withholding documents requested under FOIA.138
The theory was first articulated in United States v. Marchetti.139
In Marchetti, the government sought to enjoin a former CIA em-
ployee from publishing a book, which, according to the government,
contained classified information concerning intelligence sources,
methods, and operations.140  Although the Court granted the govern-
ment’s injunction, it did so based upon the executive right to secrecy
under the Constitution and the secrecy agreement signed by the for-
135. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
136. See generally Pozen, supra note 11.  Pozen’s Note provides an informative sum-
mary of the development and use of the mosaic theory since its first use in 1972 to
defeat requests made under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in the name
of national security.  FOIA is a federal statute granting a right of public access to
certain governmental information. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
137. 32 C.F.R. § 701.31 (2010). See also Pozen, supra note 11, at 630 (“The ‘mosaic
theory’ describes a basic precept of intelligence gathering: Disparate items of in-
formation, though individually of limited or no utility to their possessor, can take
on added significance when combined with other items of information.  Combin-
ing the items illuminates their interrelationships and breeds analytic synergies,
so that the resulting mosaic of information is worth more than the sum of its
parts.  In the context of national security, the mosaic theory suggests the poten-
tial for an adversary to deduce from independently innocuous facts a strategic
vulnerability, exploitable for malevolent ends.”).
138. See, e.g., CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 168–74 (1985) (holding that the CIA was not
required to disclose the institutional affiliates of CIA-funded researchers who
were previously found to be “intelligence sources”); Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v.
U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 935–36 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that the
Department of Justice was not required to disclose information regarding de-
tained individuals after a significant terrorist attack); New Jersey Media Grp.,
Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 218–21 (3d Cir. 2002) (denying  access to the media
on the basis of national security to certain deportation hearings); Hunt v. CIA,
981 F.2d 1116, 1119–21 (9th Cir. 1992) (denying request for CIA records of an
Iranian national); Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 8–10 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (using “mo-
saic theory” to support finding of state secrets privilege). See also Pozen, supra
note 11, at 630–31 (discussing historical use of FOIA).
139. 466 F.2d 1309, 1318 (4th Cir. 1972).
140. Id. at 1311–13.
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mer employee.141  But in so doing, the Court gave a sweeping
justification:
The significance of one item of information may frequently depend upon
knowledge of many other items of information.  What may seem trivial to the
uninformed, may appear of great moment to one who has a broad view of the
scene and may put the questioned item of information in its proper context.
The courts, of course, are ill-equipped to become sufficiently steeped in foreign
intelligence matters to serve effectively in the review of secrecy classifications
in that area.142
After Marchetti, the mosaic theory was used cautiously,143 but it
gained prominence after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade
Center.144  Today, the mosaic theory in national security is gaining an
ever-expanding role in the age of information technology and noncon-
ventional terrorism,145 and mosaic claims have proven to be
unimpeachable.146
B. Maynard, Jones, and the Mosaic Theory
1. The Maynard Decision
A mosaic theory argument was first expounded in the context of
the Fourth Amendment in United States v. Maynard.147  In Maynard,
co-conspirators Lawrence Maynard and Antoine Jones appealed their
2008 convictions for conspiracy to distribute and possession with in-
tent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base.148  The appeal addressed
several issues, none of which warranted reversal,149 except the issue
of whether defendant Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated
when law enforcement installed a GPS tracking device on Jones’s ve-
hicle without a warrant and tracked his movements for four weeks,
twenty-four hours a day.150  While several district courts addressing
this issue at the time concluded that such monitoring did not consti-
tute a “search” under the Fourth Amendment,151 relying exclusively
141. See id. at 1315–18.
142. Id. at 1318.
143. See Pozen, supra note 11, at 638–41.
144. See id. at 630–31.
145. Id. at 678–79.
146. Id. at 679 (“In over thirty years of the theory’s existence, only one FOIA court on
record has rejected a government agency’s mosaic defense.”).
147. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom.
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
148. Id. at 549.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 555.
151. See United States v.  Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v.
Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609–10 (8th Cir. 2010) (noting that even if the defendant
had standing to raise the Fourth Amendment issue, his argument would fail be-
cause the GPS unit was not a “search”); United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591
F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007).
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on principles articulated in Knotts that “[a] person travelling in an
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in his movements from one place to another,”152 the Maynard
court came to a different result.
Judge Douglas Ginsburg, writing for the majority, broke the issue
down into separate discrete questions that he addressed in order.
Judge Ginsburg first examined whether Knotts was controlling.153  In
addressing this question, the court reasoned that Knotts was not con-
trolling since Knotts dealt with limited information discovered by use
of a beeper during a single discrete trip154 and did not deal with the
type of “prolonged twenty-four hour surveillance”155 explicitly re-
served by Knotts.156  Judge Ginsberg noted that Knotts did not hold
that “a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his move-
ments whatsoever, world without end . . . .”157
Having concluded that Knotts was inapplicable, Judge Ginsburg
turned to the second question of whether the defendant had a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy in his public movements that society was
prepared to recognize as reasonable.158  For Judge Ginsburg, the an-
swer to this question depended, in large part, on whether the reasona-
ble expectation of privacy related to information that had been
“expose[d] to the public.”159  This analysis required Judge Ginsburg to
consider whether Jones’s movements had been actually or construc-
tively exposed to the public.160
On the question of actual exposure, the court found that the defen-
dant’s movements had not actually been exposed to the public because
of the slim likelihood that anybody would observe all of his movements
over a month.161  The focus was not what another was physically or
152. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983).
153. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 556–58.
154. Id. at 556.
155. Id. at 557.
156. Id. at 556–57. See also Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284 (dispensing with defendant’s argu-
ment that without judicial oversight of the use of enhanced surveillance, any citi-
zen could be the target of constant twenty-four hour surveillance, by noting, “if
such dragnet-type law enforcement practices . . . should eventually occur, there
will be time enough then to determine whether different constitutional principles
may be applicable.”).
157. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 557.
158. Id. at 558.
159. Id. at 558 (alteration in original) (citing United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 351
(1967)).
160. Id. at 558–59.
161. Id. at 558 (“[T]he totality of Jones’s movements over the course of a month
was . . . not exposed to the public: First, unlike one’s movements during a single
journey, the whole of one’s movements over the course of a month is not actually
exposed to the public because the likelihood anyone will observe all those move-
ments is effectively nil.”).
526 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:504
lawfully able to do but what a “reasonable person expects another
might actually do.”162  Judge Ginsburg notes:
It is one thing for a passerby to observe or even to follow someone during a
single journey as he goes to the market or returns home from work.  It is an-
other thing entirely for that stranger to pick up the scent again the next day
and the day after that, week in and week out, dogging his prey until he has
identified all the places, people, amusements, and chores that make up that
person’s hitherto private routine.163
To address the question of constructive exposure—whether each of
the defendant’s individual movements during the four-week prolonged
surveillance was itself in public view164—Judge Ginsburg turned to
United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee of the
Freedom Press,165 which arose under the FOIA.  In that case, the FBI
refused to disclose “rap sheets” of certain individuals even though the
raps sheets were compiled with individual events that were already a
matter of public record.166  The Supreme Court reasoned, “[T]here is a
vast difference between the public records that might be found after a
diligent search of courthouse files, county archives, and local police
stations throughout the country and a computerized summary located
in a single clearinghouse of information.”167  The Maynard court
agreed and applied a similar reasoning:
Prolonged surveillance reveals types of information not revealed by short-
term surveillance, such as what a person does repeatedly, what he does not
do, and what he does ensemble.  These types of information can each reveal
more about a person than does any individual trip viewed in isolation.  Re-
peated visits to a church, a gym, a bar, or a bookie tell a story not told by any
single visit, as does one’s not visiting any of these places over the course of a
month.  The sequence of a person’s movements can reveal still more; a single
trip to gynecologist’s office tells little about a woman, but that trip followed a
few weeks later by a visit to a baby supply store tells a different story.  A
person who knows all of another’s travels can deduce whether he is a weekly
church goer, a heavy drinker, a regular at the gym, an unfaithful husband, an
outpatient receiving medical treatment, an associate of particular individuals
or political groups—and not just one such fact about a person, but all such
facts.168
Judge Ginsburg additionally noted that while discrete pockets of
movements of the defendant may have been exposed to the public:
The whole of one’s movements over the course of a month is not constructively
exposed to the public, because like a rap sheet, that whole reveals far more
than the individual movements it comprises.  The difference is not one of de-
162. Id. at 559.
163. Id. at 560.
164. See id. at 560–61.
165. 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
166. Id. at 757.
167. Id. at 764.
168. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562.
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gree but kind, for no single journey reveals the habits and patterns that mark
the distinction between a day in the life and a way of life.169
In the re-styled case, United States v. Jones,170 the Supreme Court
reviewed Maynard and affirmed the D.C Circuit’s ruling, but on en-
tirely different reasoning.
2. The Jones Decision
As discussed above,171 the Supreme Court unanimously agreed
with the D.C. Circuit in Maynard that Jones’s Fourth Amendment
rights were violated when the government installed and subsequently
used a GPS tracking device to track Jones’s movements along public
roads for four weeks, twenty-four hours a day.172  In resolving the is-
sue, the Supreme Court opted to return to the origins of the Fourth
Amendment, adopting common-law trespass as the rationale for its
decision.173  While the majority’s opinion never broached the mosaic
theory, Justice Alito’s concurring opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, and Kagan, as well as Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion,
each seemed to embrace the rationale of the mosaic theory, at least in
principle.174
Justice Alito’s concurrence focused on “whether respondent’s rea-
sonable expectations of privacy were violated by the long-term moni-
toring of the movements of the vehicle he drove.”175  He conceded that
Knotts was only applicable to “relatively short-term monitoring of a
person’s movements.”176  But he echoed the D.C. Circuit’s mosaic the-
ory in Maynard, stating that “society’s expectation has been that law
enforcement agents and others would not—and indeed, in the main,
simply could not—secretly monitor and catalogue every single move-
ment of an individual’s car for a very long period.”177
Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence likewise endorsed a mosaic ap-
proach.  The unique attributes of GPS monitoring, led her to ask
“whether people reasonably expect that their movements will be re-
corded and aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to
ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sex-
169. Id. at 561–62.
170. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 954 (2012).
171. See supra subsection II.B.5.
172. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948–54.
173. Id. at 949–50.
174. See id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring); Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955–56 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring); supra note 21 and accompanying text.
175. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).
176. Id. at 964.
177. Id. at 964 (emphasis added).
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ual habits, and so on.”178  Her focus was on whether there are Fourth
Amendment rights “in the sum of one’s public movements.”179
Both Justice Alito’s and Justice Sotomayor’s separate concurring
opinions clearly indicate resound approval of the principles of the mo-
saic theory and reflect a five-Justice majority of the Supreme Court.
C. Issues Regarding the Implementation of the Mosaic
Theory
The introduction of the mosaic theory into Fourth Amendment ju-
risprudence has met with mixed reaction.180  Those that support the
newly formulated theory are staunch supporters,181 while those that
oppose the new theory are adamant in their opposition.182  Whatever
side one happens to fall on, the criticism of the mosaic theory is gener-
ally the same.183
The first issue raised by the adoption of the mosaic theory into
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is how to determine the scope of the
mosaic necessary to create a Fourth Amendment violation.184  In
other words, how much is too much?  The Maynard decision did not
express a bright-line rule regarding how much surveillance is required
to create a mosaic sufficient to violate the Fourth Amendment.185  In
addition, it has been proffered that the pro-mosaic opinions authored
in Maynard (Judge Ginsburg) and Jones (Justices Alito and
178. Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
179. Id. See also Kerr, supra note 21, at 328 (“Justice Sotomayor focuses on whether a
person has Fourth Amendment rights ‘in the sum’ of their public movements,
rather than in individual movements”).
180. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
182. Id.
183. See Dennis, supra note 22; Dickman, supra note 22; Ford, supra note 22.
184. See Kerr, supra note 21, at 330 (“The first challenge raised by the potential adop-
tion of a mosaic theory is selecting the proper standard for aggregation.  This
question divides into two parts.  The first requires identifying the proper refer-
ence point for when a mosaic has been created.  The second requires choosing
which stages of surveillance that the mosaic theory regulates . . . .”). See also
Ostrander, supra note 22, at 1749 (“[W]ho has the burden of proof with respect to
whether the prolonged surveillance has in fact revealed an intimate picture of an
individual’s life and thus created a mosaic?”).
185. See Maynard, 615 F. 3d at 558, 560. See also Ostrander, supra note 22, at 1748
(“Maynard left little guidance as to what durational threshold must be crossed in
order for the use of pattern-detecting technology to be sufficiently prolonged as to
render it a search.  Without a clearly demarcated line, law enforcement agents,
judges, and individuals cannot know when an aggregate of information will re-
ceive Fourth Amendment protection.”) (footnote omitted).
2014] THE MOSAIC THEORY 529
Sotomayor) each suggest a different answer.186  This ambiguity
makes it difficult to apply the mosaic theory.187
The second major criticism, and perhaps just as problematic as the
first, is determining what search methods trigger the mosaic the-
ory.188  What if the government used cell phone location data, pen reg-
istry data, wiretaps, GPS surveillance, and visual surveillance?189
Which, if any of these modes of surveillance, would be acceptable for
the purpose of a mosaic?  What if one mode of surveillance only
reveals limited information?  Does that mode of surveillance get ag-
gregated with all other modes of surveillance or just with similar or
the same modes?190  According to opponents of the mosaic theory,
these questions would need to be addressed if the mosaic theory were
adopted.191
Perhaps the most critical issue raised with respect to adoption of
the mosaic theory is the retroactive unconstitutionality that the mo-
saic theory may create.192  It is conceivable that individual compo-
nents of a search would not, in and of themselves, constitute a search
under any theory of the Fourth Amendment.  But when all the pieces
are aggregated together, the mosaic may reveal far more than the in-
dividual pieces, making the individual pieces retroactively
unconstitutional.193
The above, while not exhaustive, could have a chilling effect on law
enforcement’s exercise of the full extent of their investigatory power if
the mosaic theory is adopted.194  But that is exactly the point.  Adop-
186. See Kerr, supra note 21, at 330 (“The three pro-mosaic opinions in Maynard/
Jones each suggest a different answer.  Justice Alito focused on societal expecta-
tions about law enforcement practices . . . .  Justice Sotomayor offered a more
normative standard that looked at government power . . . .  Judge Ginsburg
. . . [focused] on whether the government learned more than a stranger could
have observed.”) (footnotes omitted).
187. See id. at 330–31.
188. Id. at 334.
189. Some or all of these search modes were used to investigate the defendants in
Maynard.  See Maynard, 615 F.3d 544.
190. See Kerr, supra note 21, at 335 (“If the mosaic theory applies to multiple surveil-
lance methods, courts must also consider whether the duration and scale ques-
tions raised earlier should be answered in the same way for every method.
Different methods of surveillance have different levels of invasiveness. As a re-
sult, different methods of surveillance might require different regulation within
the mosaic framework.”).
191. Id.
192. See Ostrander, supra note 22, at 1748–49 (“As soon as a pattern is created, previ-
ously permissible individual law enforcement steps become unconstitutional.”).
193. See Walsh, supra note 22, at 235.
194. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH L. REV. 801, 883–84 (2004)
(“[I]nterstitial rulemaking that leaves the rules unclear lessens the clarity of the
limits on the government’s powers to invade privacy, underdeterring police be-
havior in some contexts and overdeterring it in others.”); id. at 861 (“The rules of
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tion of the mosaic theory will force law enforcement officials to adopt
guidelines and procedures and make critical decisions regarding the
use of certain investigatory techniques so as to avoid having valuable
evidence excluded, erring on the side of caution by obtaining a war-
rant or utilizing their investigatory methods in a less intrusive or abu-
sive manner.  In the wake of advanced technology, the mosaic theory
will provide a balancing effect—equilibrium if you will—between
Fourth Amendment privacy rights and the need for effective and effi-
cient law enforcement by restoring the practical considerations that
once limited the extent to which law enforcement could intrude on
one’s privacy without violating the Fourth Amendment.
IV. EQUILIBRIUM EFFECT OF THE MOSAIC THEORY
A. The Mosaic Concept
Despite the varying and complex issues regarding the implementa-
tion of the mosaic theory, this Article proffers that the mosaic theory
may be a viable solution for the protection of Fourth Amendment pri-
vacy rights in the wake of advanced surveillance and tracking technol-
ogy.  However, in order to truly appreciate the complexity of
introducing the mosaic theory into Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
it is first necessary to understand what is at stake.  Take, for instance,
the bombings during the 2013 Boston Marathon.
On April 15, 2013, two pressure cooker bombs exploded during the
Boston Marathon seconds apart, killing three people and injuring
265.195  With the aid of surveillance cameras,196 private security cam-
eras, and photos shot by bystanders on smartphones, it took the FBI
only three days to identify the two suspects.197  Arguably, without the
aid of surveillance cameras, the suspects may have continued their
criminal procedure . . . tell government agents what they can and cannot do to
collect evidence of crime and identify wrongdoers.  Because these rules limit gov-
ernment power, rule clarity minimizes official discretion and encourages compli-
ance.  Unclear rules mean unclear limits on government power, increasing the
likelihood of abuses by aggressive government officials.”) (footnotes omitted).
195. See Miranda Leitsinger, Marathon Bomb Victims Adjust to a ‘Different Normal,’
NBC NEWS, (May 15, 2013), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/05/15/18256
453-marathon-bomb-victims-adjust-to-a-different-normal?lite.
196. According to estimates in 2007, there were 147 surveillance cameras operated by
Boston city officials. See Henry Ridgwell, Boston Bombing Sparks Surveillance
Camera Debate, VOICE OF AMERICA, (Apr. 24, 2013), http://www.voanews.com/con
tent/boston-bombing-sparks-surveillance-camera-debate/1648071.html.
197. “Former FBI Special Agent Peter J. Ahearn says surveillance cameras are one of
the primary tools of investigation.  ‘The first thing you do in any kind of a crisis in
an area is you go for the tapes, you go for the video. The ATM machines, anything
on the street and there will be a team of investigators and analysts working
that.’” Id.
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terrorist rampage.198  Despite the numerous calls for privacy in the
wake of increased use of surveillance cameras across the country,199
few would argue against the use of surveillance cameras in Boston on
that infamous April 15th day.200  In fact, in the wake of the Boston
bombings, there was increased interest in the use of surveillance cam-
eras across the country.201  So, how do we begin to balance the need
for the type of surveillance used so successfully in Boston and the need
for law enforcement to investigate and prevent crime with society’s
need to have some measure of privacy, especially in public?  Specifi-
cally, how do we balance society’s reasonable expectation of privacy in
one’s public movements with the practical guarantees of the Fourth
Amendment, while allowing law enforcement officials the necessary
latitude to investigate and prevent crime, especially under the current
proscriptions of the Fourth Amendment?  Of course, there are times
when the collection, recording, and storage of information en mass is a
good thing—case in point, Boston.  But there are times when such col-
lection, recording, and storage do not comport with the reasonable ex-
pectations of society’s view of privacy.  So what is the correct answer?
Ultimately, the answer may lie with the application of the mosaic
theory.
B. Application of the Mosaic Theory
There are two extreme competing interests in the debate concern-
ing privacy and advance surveillance technologies: society’s reasona-
ble expectation of privacy in their public movements and law
enforcements need to properly investigate and prevent crime.  How-
ever, as aptly put by President Obama in a press conference on June 7,
2013, concerning revelations of massive data mining by the National
198. See Greg Botelho & Josh Levs, Boston Bombing Suspects Planned Times Square
Attack, Bloomberg Says, CNN, (Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/25/
us/boston-attack.
199. See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, The Boston Bombing, the Right of Privacy and Sur-
veillance Cameras, Post in The Blog, HUFFINGTON POST (May 6, 2013, 1:15 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/geoffrey-r-stone/the-boston-bombing-the-ri_b_322
3871.html (“The practice of using surveillance cameras to record our comings and
goings is ever-expanding, and will certainly expand still further after the Boston
bombings.”).
200. But see Heather Kelly, After Boston: The Pros and Cons of Surveillance Cameras,
CNN (April 26, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/26/tech/innovation/security-
cameras-boston-bombings. (“We like to think we have some privacy in our lives,
that we can go places that we don’t necessarily want the government to know
about,” said Jennifer Lynch, an attorney at the Electronic Frontier Foundation,
an Internet civil-liberties group.  “What concerns me is if all of those cameras get
linked together at some point, and if we apply facial recognition on the back end,
we’ll be able to track people wherever they go.”).
201. See, e.g., Boston Attacks Inspire Use of Surveillance Cameras in Cities Nation-
wide, PBS (May 15, 2013), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/nation/
jan-june13/surveillance_05-15.html.
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Security Agency,202 “We’re going to have to make some choices as a
society. . . .  It’s important to recognize that you can’t have 100 percent
security and also then have 100 percent privacy and zero inconve-
nience.”203  This is where the mosaic theory comes into play.
Under the current proscriptions of the Fourth Amendment, in in-
vestigating crimes, law enforcement officials require a warrant sup-
ported by probable cause204 or, in some cases, just probable cause or
reasonable suspicion that a crime has been or will soon be commit-
ted.205  In the latter instances, when law enforcement is operating
without a warrant, the reasonableness of the government’s conduct
under the Fourth Amendment can be a difficult question to address in
light of the varying constitutional thresholds that may be applicable to
the government’s conduct.  For example, when the government
searches a home, a warrant supported by probable cause is generally
required.206  However, when the government searches a motor vehi-
cle, only probable cause is required, and no warrant is necessary.207
Searches of individuals for weapons only require reasonable suspi-
cion.208  In the advent of advanced surveillance and tracking technol-
ogy, the applicable constitutional reasonableness standards can
become even more muddled because these technologies can be used
without violating any constitutional reasonableness standard under
the current proscriptions of the Fourth Amendment.209  As such,
traditional Fourth Amendment guarantees have waned in the face of
advanced surveillance and tracking technology.  On the other hand,
the need for effective and diligent law enforcement efforts is ever more
important in what may be becoming a terroristic technological society.
The mosaic theory offers a way to restore the equilibrium between the
traditional privacy protections that practical limitations safeguarded
in the pre-computer age210 and the need for vigilant law enforcement.
202. See Sam Stein, NSA Surveillance Program Oversight: White House, Congress
Point Fingers at Each Other, HUFFINGTON POST (June 7, 2013), http://www.huff
ingtonpost.com/2013/06/07/nsa-surveillance-program-oversight_n_3405716.html.
203. See Lara Jakes & Darlene Superville, Obama Defends NSA, Says America Has to
Make Choices Between Privacy and Security, HUFFINGTON POST (June 7, 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/07/obama-defends-nsa_n_3406448.html.
204. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.”).
205. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
206. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
207. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985).
208. See Terry, 392 U.S. 1.
209. See Gatewood, supra note 34 and accompanying text.
210. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in
judgment) (“In the pre-computer age, the greatest protections of privacy were
neither constitutional nor statutory, but practical.”).
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C. Equilibrium Effect of the Mosaic Theory
Professor Orin S. Kerr argues that much of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence is based on what he describes as “equilibrium-adjust-
ment.”211  Professor Kerr describes equilibrium-adjustment as
follows:
Equilibrium-adjustment acts as a correction mechanism.  When judges per-
ceive that changing technology or social practice significantly weakens police
power to enforce the law, courts adopt lower Fourth Amendment protections
for these new circumstances to help restore the status quo ante.  On the other
hand, when judges perceive that changing technology or social practice signifi-
cantly enhances government power, courts embrace higher protections to
counter the expansion of government power.212
As advanced surveillance and tracking technology have greatly ex-
panded the government’s power, adoption of the mosaic theory would
coexist with Professor Kerr’s view of Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence by restoring the past level of Fourth Amendment protections.
Under the current prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment, “rela-
tively short-term monitoring of a person’s movements on public
streets”213 would be permitted by law enforcement officials having
probable cause or reasonable suspicion.214  Likewise, the use of many
other investigatory surveillance techniques to collect and store limited
information, presumably to yield sufficient information necessary to
secure a warrant, would also be permitted so long as they do not in-
volve a trespass or invade a constitutionally protected area.215  It is
unclear under current constitutional proscriptions how much informa-
tion can be collected and stored or how long the government may in-
vestigate an individual using enhanced surveillance technology.216
Implementing the mosaic theory to these kinds of Fourth Amendment
issues will force the government to make these practical assessments
regarding how much and how long or risk having evidence excluded if
we assume that the appropriate remedy for a Fourth Amendment vio-
lation under the mosaic theory would be the exclusion of the evidence
211. Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125
HARV. L. REV. 476, 487–88 (2011).
212. Id.
213. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).
214. Id. See also United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983) (discussing the
reasonable privacy expectations of individuals in specific situations).
215. See Gatewood, supra note 34 and accompanying text.
216. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment) (“We need not
identify with precision the point at which the tracking of this vehicle became a
search . . . .”).  Likewise, Justice Sotomayor opined that short-term GPS monitor-
ing would “require particular attention” from the Court. See id. at 955
(Sotomayor, J., concurring). See also United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544,
558–63 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“It is one thing for a passerby to observe or even to follow
someone during a single journey . . . .  It is another thing entirely for that stran-
ger to pick up the scent again the next day and the day after that . . . .”).
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gathered in violation thereof.217  This assessment will necessarily in-
clude an assessment by the government as to the scope of the mosaic
theory’s reach, including whether or not too much information is being
collected and stored or whether or not enhanced tracking surveillance
is too long, thereby violating the Fourth Amendment under the mosaic
theory.  This assessment mirrors the practical considerations that pro-
tected Fourth Amendment rights in the past.  Prior to modern digital
technology, law enforcement officials routinely had to make critical as-
sessments as to how much manpower, how much time, and how many
resources they would or could devote to a giving suspect.  In making
this assessment, no doubt decisions had to be made regarding the po-
tential of obtaining sufficient evidence to meet the probable cause
standard.  Those suspects that were of limited value most likely re-
ceived less attention in terms of manpower, time, and resources, thus
preserving a degree of privacy as a practical matter, while higher-val-
ued suspects received the bulk of the resources.  But even then, the
degree of privacy intrusion was still limited by practical considera-
tions that included how much time to devote and how much informa-
tion could physically be collected.218  These practical limitations are
exactly what protected Fourth Amendment rights in an earlier age.
The advent of advanced technology has changed the landscape of
“dragnet type”219 surveillance from something that was “difficult and
costly”220 to something “relatively easy and cheap.”221  The goal of the
mosaic theory would be to force law enforcement to make critical deci-
sions regarding the use of such technology instead of using it indis-
criminately without concern to privacy implications.  In cases where
law enforcement officials are unsure whether particular surveillance
activity would fall outside the ambient of the mosaic theory, then law
enforcement would have the option of seeking independent judicial re-
view and securing a warrant, which, after all, is the point of the
Fourth Amendment.222  As a result, law enforcement is free to pursue
its investigation in any practical matter it deems fit, keeping in mind
217. Professor Orin S. Kerr questions whether mosaic search violations should trigger
the exclusionary rule because the cost of the exclusionary rule would outweigh it
benefits. See Kerr, supra note 21, at 340–43.
218. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment) (“Traditional sur-
veillance for any extended period of time was difficult and costly and therefore
rarely undertaken.”).
219. See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284 (“[I]f such dragnet-type law enforcement prac-
tices . . . should eventually occur, there will be time enough then to determine
whether different constitutional principles may be applicable.”).
220. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).
221. Id. at 963–64.
222. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948) (“The point of the Fourth
Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies
law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw
from evidence.  Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn
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that abuses of technology could result in violations of the Fourth
Amendment.  This resulting effect makes the mosaic theory the great
equalizer.  Thus, what practical considerations did for Fourth Amend-
ment privacy rights in the pre-computer age, the mosaic theory will do
for privacy rights in the wake of advanced technology.
Nevertheless, the question that still remains is why the onus
should be on the government, rather than the courts or legislature, to
determine the scope of the mosaic theory’s reach.  In other words, why
should not the courts or legislature provide specific guidance to law
enforcement on the degree of permissible intrusion that will be per-
mitted by the use of specific technology?  The simple answer is that
the courts and legislature cannot keep up with the speed of technol-
ogy.223  There is no fix-all law that will address all current and future
technological advances.  By not articulating specific standards in
terms of how much information is too much or how long is too long to
conduct surveillance, the courts are free to address each new techno-
logical advance on a case-by-case basis to determine if the necessary
mosaic has been created.  Law enforcement and privacy will best be
served and preserved if the government is forced to make critical deci-
sions regarding the use and abuse of advanced technology.
V. CONCLUSION
Justice Alito said it best: “[S]ociety’s expectation has been that law
enforcement agents and others would not—and indeed, in the main,
simply could not—secretly monitor and catalogue every single move-
ment of an individual’s car for a very long period.”224  It is simply that
in everyday life, we reasonably expect even in public, certain facts con-
cerning our daily comings and goings will remain private, not because
we intend for them to be private (in most instances) but because we do
not expect that any one person would be privy to all of our day’s
events.225  Implementing the mosaic theory, despite all of the criti-
by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer en-
gaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”).
223. See Eleanor Birrell, Technology and the Fourth Amendment: Balancing Law En-
forcement with Individual Privacy 1, 1 (May 20, 2007) (final project for Computer
Science, Harvard University), available at http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/cs199r/
fp/Eleanor.pdf (“One of the reasons for the imbalance between privacy and law
enforcement is the lengthy gap between the availability of a new technology and
the passage of regulations (either legal or judicial) governing its use.  Without
any legal or judicial restrictions, law enforcement agencies are free to take ad-
vantage of new technologies for years, potentially violating privacy of American
citizens.”).
224. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).
225. See Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amend-
ment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV 119, 134 (2002)
(suggesting that because people do not expect to be followed from place to place,
there is some measure of privacy expected in one’s public movements).
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cism raised regarding its application, will help preserve the practical
guarantees of the Fourth Amendment by restoring practical limita-
tions and by balancing the government’s interest in investigating
crime and society’s interest in maintaining privacy in and out of the
public eye.  The mosaic theory comports to our real world expectations
of privacy much better than the idea that what a person knowingly
exposes to the public cannot also be subject to a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy.  It also preserves a degree of public privacy in the face
of advanced technology without completely undermining law enforce-
ment’s efforts to investigate and prevent crime.
